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Abstract The number of municipalities in Japan has decreased from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,820 in 2006 
because of municipal mergers, called Heisei-no-Daigappei. This paper estimates the political choices of 
local council members in Japan’s municipal mergers. In Japan, being a local council member is a 
full-time job. The local council has “veto powers” over local administration. Since the wage for 
a local council member is quite high, council members like to keep their seats. The jobs of local 
council members are affected by municipal mergers, as preferential treatment and penalties are 
delivered by the central government to the local government in municipal mergers. In our results, 
merged municipalities apply “Special Provisions” for local council members because of the size of the 
municipality. The choice of municipality is also affected by the national government’s political power. 
In addition, Special Provisions lead to additional fiscal burdens. These fiscal burdens will transfer to the 
whole country because “the Local Allocation Tax grants system” (abbreviated as LAT grants), a 
national grants system, works well in Japan. The municipalities that choose the Special Provisions 
exploit the benefits from other municipalities without any additional costs. Our results show that the 
central government induces the free-rider problem in Japan. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The number of municipalities in Japan decreased from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,820 in 2006 by municipal 
mergers, called Heisei-no-Daigappei. Municipal mergers intend to strengthen the administrative 
capacity of municipalities for fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, in terms of the economics-of-scale 
effect, municipal mergers can decrease the total expenditures of local governments. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effects of the political choices of local council members 
in Japan’s municipal mergers. In Japan, being a local council member is a full-time job. The local 
council has “veto powers” over local administration. Since the wage for a local council member is quite 
high, council members like to keep their seats. The jobs of local council members are affected by 
municipal mergers, as preferential treatment and penalties are delivered by the central government to the 
local government in municipal mergers.  
Research on municipal mergers is mainly focused on the decision making process and the economies 
of scale of expenditure. For example, Sørensen (2006) examined political factors of merger decisions as 
well as expected efficiency gains with data on Norwegian municipalities. Of the empirical results in 
Japan, several confirmed incentives for mergers. Hirota (2007), Kawaura (2009) and Kawamura (2010) 
studied the incentives for municipal mergers in local public finance in Japan using a multinomial and 
nested logit model. Hirota (2007) reported that factors for the merger of municipalities are bad fiscal 
conditions, municipalities with depopulated areas and municipalities with small areas. In particular, the 
results confirm that preferential treatment by the central government has effects on mergers of 
municipalities. In addition, the behavior of neighboring municipalities affects decision making for 
mergers. With respect to the effect of economies of scale on expenditure, Hanes (2003) studied 
amalgamation impact on the local public expenditure in Sweden. Dolley et al. (2007) reported the effect 
of mergers on total expenditure in Australia, and Geys et al. (2007) considered Germany.1 Recently, 
Hirota and Yunoue (2009) investigated the scale effect using panel data on Japanese municipalities and 
found that municipalities achieved reductions in their total expenditures with mergers.  
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between the choices of local councils and municipal 
mergers. There is a possibility that political and sociogeographic factors influence the decisions of 
municipalities in Japan to merge. There are policies such that local councils of merged municipalities 
can choose Zainin Tokurei (Special Provisions of Holding Seats (SPHS) and Teisu Tokurei (Special 
Provisions of Relaxation of Legal Size (RLS)). The former deals with the protection of the jobs of local 
council members and the latter deals with the structural change of local councils. These policies provide 
preferential treatment for council mergers by the central government, which of course lead to additional 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bodkin and Conklin (1971), Hirsh (1959, 1965), and Walzer (1972), who studied European countries and 
the U.S. 
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fiscal burdens. 
In addition, our research relates to the common pool problem. If some municipalities choose the 
Special Provisions, they free ride on other municipalities. This is because the structure of Japanese local 
public finance is that it is received as “large grants” from the central government (general grants system, 
abbreviated as LAT grants). While a significant portion of local government expenditure is financed by 
transfers from the central government, the fiscal resource of the LAT grants is national taxes. In addition, 
the amount of LAT grants of each municipality is determined based on the municipality’s fiscal shortage 
(Ihori 2009; Saito and Yunoue 2009). Therefore, an increase of a municipality’s expenditure leads to an 
increase in the LAT grant. This causes an additional fiscal burden nationwide. In Special Provisions for 
municipal mergers, a merged municipality also receives preferential treatment (for example, expansion 
of LAT grants) from the central government. In other words, the central government manipulates the 
merged municipality to take free ride on other local governments to the merged municipality. 
The recent literature relating to the free-rider problem of municipal mergers is discussed in Nelson 
(1992), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Baqir (2002), Bradbury and Stephenson (2003), Tyrefors Hinnerich 
(2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2010). According to Hirota and Yunoue (2011), an additional expense of 
a local council was observed when a municipality applied the SPHS. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses municipal mergers in Japan. Section 
3 defines the empirical model and provides the results of the logit estimation. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2 Municipal mergers in Japan 
 
2.1 Background of municipal mergers 
 
To start with, we briefly explain Japanese fiscal decentralization. There are three layers of government 
structures in Japan. There are the central, prefectural and municipal governments. The local government 
involves prefectures and municipalities. Japan has tended toward centralization in administration and 
public finance for the last several decades. The central government has a strong influence on the 
prefectural or municipal governments. In local public finance, local government has largely depended 
on intergovernmental transfers from the central government for a long time. For example, the Local 
Allocation Tax grants system (abbreviated as LAT grants) has extremely strong effects on fiscal 
adjustment. The LAT grants system involves about 17 trillion yen every year and contributes about 20% 
of local government revenues. In fiscal 2003, over 3,000 municipalities received LAT grants from the 
central government (Ihori 2009; Saito and Yunoue 2009). 
In recent years, both central and local governments have suffered from fiscal problems and a 
declining and aging population, particularly in local government. Given these problems, the central 
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government has been aggressively promoting fiscal and political decentralization since the 
Decentralization Act in 2000. In addition, the Koizumi Cabinet implemented the plan on the Triple 
Reform from 2003 to 2005. These reforms are the shifting of the tax source from the central to the local 
governments, reducing subsidies and reviewing LAT grants. The intent of the Triple Reform is to replace 
specific and general-purpose subsidies with local taxes (see Saito and Yunoue 2009). As a result, 
government subsidies were reduced by about 5.2 trillion yen, the tax source was shifted from the central 
government to the local governments by about 3 trillion yen, and LAT grants were reduced by about 3.6 
trillion yen (Ihori 2009). 
The central government encourages municipal mergers in tandem with work on economic and fiscal 
structural reforms. Through the municipal merger process, known as Heisei-no-Daigappei, the number 
of municipalities in Japan decreased from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,820 in 2006. The principal objectives of 
municipal mergers are to achieve a strengthening of administration and an improvement in its fiscal 
condition. Mergers are expected to reduce total expenditure because of economies of scale. In order to 
promote municipal mergers, the central government variously supports the local government by Shi Tyo 
Son no Gappei no Tokurei ni kansuru Horitu, which is the Special Municipal Mergers Law from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC). 
The Special Municipal Mergers Law, the so-called Ame to Muchi no Seisaku (the Carrot-and-Stick 
Policy), was promised to merged municipalities for various preferential treatments and punishments for 
a few years. This law was temporary legislation until March 2006. During this period, merged 
municipalities received preferential treatment (carrot policy) from the central government: expansion of 
LAT grants and local tax measures, special bonds on the mergers, and special provisions of local council 
members. On the contrary, nonmerged municipalities, in particular small villages, received punishment 
(stick policy), such as shrinking of LAT grants. 
In addition, there was a relaxation of the population’s requirements for upgrading to Seirei Shitei 
Toshi (the government-designated cities). A government-designated city is able to have increased 
authority as well as prefecture government. The central government relaxed requirements to the extent 
of setting the population requirements from one million to 0.7 million persons. In addition, when towns 
are upgraded to cities, the requirements are temporarily relaxed to the extent of setting the population 
limit at 30,000 or more. 
In the policies above, the central government manipulated municipalities with the carrot-and-stick 
approach. In this paper, we focus on priority local council members and the political choices of merged 
municipalities. 
 4 
 
2.2 Special provisions of the local council members 
 
We briefly explain the size of local councils within municipalities. Table 1 shows an upper limit of the 
local council size depending on the extent of the municipality’s population (Local Autonomy Act, 
Article 91). The number of local council members usually reaches upper limit. Notice that there are 
exceptions for large cities. In a city whose population is over 900,000, an upper limit of the local council 
size is decided as follows. The local council size of a large city is increased by eight persons for each 
additional 500,000 persons in the population. For example, if the population size is 1,400,000 (equals 
900,000 plus 500,000), an upper limit of local council size is 64 (equals 56 plus 8). 
In this section, we explain the Act on Special Provisions of the Merger of Municipalities about local 
council members (abbreviated as Special Provisions). There are two articles of Special Provisions for 
local councils. 2  Since the central government wishes to promote municipal mergers, the Special 
Provisions for local councils are preferential treatment (carrot policy) under municipal mergers. 
The first is Zainin Tokurei, which is the Special Provisions of Holdings Seats (SPHS). This law 
provides job protection for local council members. When a merged municipality selects the SPHS, a 
local council member of the former municipality can stay in the new municipality for a few years. This 
is a preferential treatment to address political opposition to the merger by local council members. For 
example, if two cities (City A and City B) and one town (Town C) have a plan to merge and the numbers 
of the former council members are 34, 30 and 14, respectively, then the local council size of the new 
municipality will be 78 when they apply the SPHS. On the contrary, the upper limit of council members 
would be only 46 without the SPHS. In this example, 32 council members receive the preferable 
treatment of retaining their seats. 
The second is Teisu Tokurei, which is the Special Provisions of Relaxation of Legal Size (RLS). This 
law allows the structural change of a local council. When a merged municipality selects the RLS, it is 
possible to relax the upper limit of its local council’s legal size up to twice the upper limit of normal 
municipalities for a few years. However, when a merged municipality does not use both the SPHS and 
the RLS, the merged municipality elects a new local council with an upper limit as reported in Table 1. 
                                                 
2 Another Special Provision is a retirement pension plan. When former local council members automatically lose their job 
under municipal mergers, the central government regards retired council members as regular members of the local council and 
pays them a pension. 
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3 Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Data and summary statistics 
 
We estimate a binary choice model using Japanese municipality data. We have cross-sectional data of 
the 549 merged municipalities for three years (2003-2005). Because we focus on the political choice of 
the merged municipality, the nonmerged municipalities are excluded from our sample. The municipal 
government’s data are mainly derived from the Shi Tyo Son Kessan Card (Statistics of Final Account of 
Municipal Governments) and the Gappei Digital Archive (Digital Archive of Municipal Mergers).3 
We mainly focus on two kinds of factors, sociogeographic and political. First, we use 
sociogeographic factors that are represented by population, area, number of former municipalities 
included in a merged municipality, coalfield areas, remote islands, and depopulated areas. The 
coalfields, remote islands and depopulated areas have been designated by the MIC as requiring special 
support. For example, many coalfield areas remain in bad financial circumstances. This sociogeographic 
factor, which includes the fiscal condition, influences the political choice of the merged municipality. 
This is the reason why we consider the sociogeographic factors of municipalities as dependent variables. 
Second, we are interested in whether the political factors affect the merged municipalities or not. We 
show the Japanese government structure in Figure 1. In Japan, because not only financial supports but 
also personnel exchanges have strong influences, the central government controls the prefectures. 
Moreover, the prefectures influence municipalities with financial and personnel power. For reference, 
independent variables of each political factor include the following. 
 
Prefecture Instruction Pattern: The MIC requested prefectures to set up Merger Support Measures to 
help municipalities to progress municipal mergers. Thus, the prefectures instructed a combination of 
municipalities. Because of the long history of a centralized system in Japan, this instruction to a 
combination of municipalities is not conclusive but it has a strong influence on the municipalities. If 
the “observed” combination of municipal mergers coincided with the “instructed” combination, then 
the dummy variable equals 1 and is zero otherwise. This dummy variable shows the degree of 
upper-level government’s influence on the political choice of the lower-level government. In other 
words, if the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant, then the upper-level government has 
influence on the political choice of the lower-level government. 
Details of the observed combinations of municipal mergers and the instructed combination set 
dummy variable involve the following four patterns: 
                                                 
3 Gappei Digital Archive (http://www.gappei-archive.soumu.go.jp/ MIC). 
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(1) if the instructed combination is (City A, City B and Town C), and the observed 
combination is (A, B and C), then the dummy variable equals 1; 
(2) if the instructed combination is (A, B and C), and the observed combination is (A 
and B), then the dummy variable equals zero; 
(3) if the instructed combination is (A, B and C), and the observed combination is (A, 
B, C and D), then the dummy variable equals zero; 
(4) if the instructed combination has two patterns (A, B and C) (D, E and F), and the 
observed combination is (A, B, C, D, E and F), then the dummy variable equals 1; 
where A, B, C, D, E, F represent the municipalities. 
 
Prefectural Governor from the Bureaucracy: In Japanese local administration and finance, the 
upper-level government often has a strong influence on the lower-level government because of 
personnel relationships.4 MIC bureaucrats have become prefectural governors in some Japanese 
local administrations for nearly 100 years. They might be actively implementing a policy towards 
the realization of municipal mergers. If a prefectural governor was previously an MIC bureaucrat, 
then the dummy variable equals 1 and is zero otherwise. 
 
The numbers of the RLS and the SPHS applications by prefecture are reported in Figure 2. 
According to Figure 2, Hiroshima and Kagoshima achieved the highest number of applications of the 
RLS of 8. On the other hand, differences were observed for the SPHS. The highest number of 
applications of the SPHS was 24 for Ibaraki. Using Figure 2, we confirmed the differences among 
prefecture governments as regards the choice of Special Provisions of Local Council Members. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The mean value of the population data is 87,975. While 
the maximum value of the population is about 1.4 million, the minimum value is 1,572. In the data of 
merged municipalities, sample variability of the population data is large. Similarly, area and number of 
municipalities included in municipal mergers vary greatly in these data. 
Moreover, summary statistics of municipalities that apply the SPHS or the RLS, are reported in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. There are 313 municipalities that applied the SPHS. On the other hand, 88 
municipalities applied the RLS. It is of interest to point out the statistical difference between the SPHS 
and the RLS. Comparing the mean value of the population data of the RLS with that of the SPHS, it is 
clear that the mean value of the population of the RLS is large. The mean value of population data of the 
RLS is 199,692. On the contrary, that of the SPHS is 72,724. It is likewise clear that area and number of 
municipalities exhibit statistical differences between the RLS and the SPHS. The mean value of area of 
the RLS is 581 km2, but that of the SPHS is 305 km2. The maximum value of number of municipalities 
                                                 
4 Sumi (2000) and Yunoue (2005) reported that LAT grants derived by personnel relationships are observed in Japan. 
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included in merged municipalities is 14 for the RLS and it is 8 for the SPHS. 
 
3.2 Empirical model and results 
 
We estimate what factors of municipalities affect their choice of the Special Provisions in the mergers 
using the empirical model, defined by equation (1): 
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01 * ≥= ii yify  
00 * <= ii yify  
 
and i  refers to the i th municipality; β  represents the coefficients of independent variables; and iε  is 
an error term composed by identically independent random variables with standard logistic distribution. 
*y  is latent variable. The dependent variable iy  is considered to be two patterns of municipality choice 
as follows. 
 
(1) “Special Provisions of Holdings Seats (SPHS)”: the aim of our regression for the SPHS is to examine 
the choice of job protection for local council members. 
(2) “Special Provisions of Relaxation of Legal Size (RLS)”: the objectives of our regression for the RLS 
are to examine the choice of structural changes of local councils. 
 
The independent variables include sociodemographic characteristics such as population, squared 
population, area, dummy variable for coalfield areas, dummy variable for remote islands and dummy 
variable for depopulated areas. The variable iofmumNum.  represents the number of former 
municipalities included in a merged municipality. We also consider the political factors: 
inInstructiopre _  is a dummy variable indicating the prefecture’s political power in municipal mergers; 
and iGovernorpre _  is a dummy variable representing the presence of MIC’s 
bureaucrat-turned-prefectural governor.  
The empirical results of the choice of the SPHS are reported in Table 5.5 The coefficient of the 
population term is statistically significant at the 5% level. Because the coefficient of population is 
positive and the coefficient on squared population is negative, this implies that additional population 
                                                 
5 See also the marginal effect of the probability of each variable in Figure 3. 
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size has a positive effect on choice probability of the SPHS for low-population municipalities. On the 
other hand, the population effect becomes negative for high-population cities. The coefficient of the 
number of previous municipalities is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results 
are quite intuitive. The SPHS is the most preferable policy for local council members, and, thus, local 
council members hope to apply this special provision. However, the physical capacity of the council 
floor is limited, and, therefore, the small municipalities tend to choose the SPHS. The coefficient of the 
depopulated area dummy variable is estimated to be negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This result seems to conflict with the former results. According to Hirota and Yunoue (2011), additional 
expenses of local councils were observed when a municipality applies the SPHS.6 Because depopulated 
areas have poor fiscal conditions, they are unable to afford the additional fiscal burden to increase the 
number of local council members. The coefficient of the Prefecture Instruction Pattern dummy is 
positive and statistically significant. A municipality that is affected by the prefecture’s political power 
tends to choose the SPHS. This implies that some merged municipalities were indirectly induced by the 
carrot policy of the MIC through prefectural instruction. 
The empirical results for the RLS are reported in Table 6. The estimated values of the population 
terms are contrary to those for the SPHS. A large population city has a high probability of choosing the 
RLS. Similarly, the coefficient of the area term is positive and statistically significant; municipalities 
whose areas are large tend to choose the RLS. The coefficient of the number of former municipalities is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the political term is not estimated to be 
statistically significant. Prefecture instruction and prefectural governor from the Bureaucracy do not 
significantly affect the choice of the RLS. These results imply that large cities have an incentive to 
upgrade their status by mergers. Since upgrading a city status leads to more power of registration, cities 
that face the promotion of status tend to merge with other cities. Therefore, the instruction of prefecture 
or the leadership of a governor does not significantly affect the choice of the Special Provisions. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the political choice of municipal mergers in Japan for both the SPHS and the 
RLS for merged municipalities. 
First, a small-sized municipality has a high probability of choosing the SPHS. The carrot policy of 
the central government leads to the promotion of municipal mergers. The choice of the SPHS is also 
affected by the prefecture’s political power. This implies that some merged municipalities were 
indirectly induced by the carrot policy of the MIC through prefectural instruction. Second, a large-sized 
municipality has a high probability of choosing the RLS. Their private incentives tend to merge with 
                                                 
6 Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) showed that the size of government spending is positively related to the number of 
legislators using German municipal panel data. 
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those of other cities, and they the RLS to upgrade to larger cities. In other words, political factors do not 
affect the choice of the RLS. 
These Special Provisions lead to an additional fiscal burden. This fiscal burden will transfer to the 
whole country since the LAT grants system, a nationwide grants system, works well in Japan. The 
municipalities that choose the Special Provisions exploit the benefits from other municipalities without 
any additional costs. Our results show that the central government induces the free-rider problem in 
Japan. 
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Fig 1. Japanese Government structure 
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Table 1. Local Council-Size Law: Japanese municipalities 
Population size Number of council members Population size Number of council members
         ~50,000 26 ~2,000 12
50,000 ~100,000 30 2,000~5,000 14
100,000 ~200,000 34 5,000~10,000 18
200,000~300,000 38 10,000~20,000 22
300,000~500,000 46 20,000~ 26
500,000~900,000 56
900,000~ 56~96
City Town and village
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Special Provisions of holdings seats Dummy 549 0.570 0.496 0 1
Relaxation of legal-size Dummy 549 0.160 0.367 0 1
Population 549 87975.890 137236.000 1572.000 1392746.000
Area 549 355.207 292.316 13.310 2179.350
Num. of municipalities 549 3.521 1.867 2.000 14.000
Coal Field Area Dummy 549 0.020 0.140 0 1
Remote Islands Dummy 549 0.104 0.305 0 1
Depopulated Area Dummy 549 0.617 0.486 0 1
Prefecture Instruction Pattern Dummy 549 0.158 0.366 0 1
Prefectural Governor from MIC Dummy 549 0.291 0.455 0 1  
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of Special Provisions of Holdings Seats (SPHS) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 313 72724.1 107965.3 1572 1173418
Area 313 305.4 245.63 13.31 1373.89
Num. of municipalities 313 3.1 1.19 2 8
Coal Field Area Dummy 313 0.022 0.1481 0 1
Remote Islands Dummy 313 0.540 0.4992 0 1
Depopulated Area Dummy 313 0.077 0.2665 0 1
Prefecture Instruction Pattern Dummy 313 0.166 0.3728 0 1
Prefectural Governor from MIC Dummy 313 0.300 0.4591 0 1  
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of Relaxation of Legal Size (RLS) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 88 199692.8 231666.8 6630 1173418
Area 88 581.3 362.61 87.6 2179.35
Num. of municipalities 88 5.3 2.71 2 14
Coal Field Area Dummy 88 0.011 0.1066 0 1
Remote Islands Dummy 88 0.784 0.4138 0 1
Depopulated Area Dummy 88 0.205 0.4057 0 1
Prefecture Instruction Pattern Dummy 88 0.193 0.3971 0 1
Prefectural Governor from MIC Dummy 88 0.239 0.4287 0 1  
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Fig 2. Application numbers of Special Provisions 
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Table 5. Binary logit model estimation results: 
Special Provisions of Holdings Seats 
 
Special Provisions
of holdings seats Marginal effects
ln(Population) 3.308** 0.811**
(1.341) (0.329)
ln(Population)2 -0.156** -0.038**
(0.061) (0.015)
ln(Area) 0.071 0.017
(0.148) (0.036)
Num. of municipalities -0.346*** -0.085***
(0.070) (0.017)
Coal Field Area Dummy 0.610 0.140
(0.706) (0.147)
Remote Islands Dummy -0.282 -0.070
(0.323) (0.081)
Depopulated Area Dummy -0.574** -0.138**
(0.255) (0.060)
Prefecture Instruction Pattern Dummy 0.499* 0.118*
(0.269) (0.061)
Prefectural Governor from Bureaucrat Dummy -0.089 -0.022
(0.207) (0.051)
Constant -15.984**
(7.352)
Observations 549 549
Log likelihood -341.079
Pseudo R2 0.090
Marginal effects after logit 0.569
Variables
(1)
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 15 
 
Table 6. Empirical results for Relaxation of Legal Size 
 
Relaxation of
legal-size Marginal effects
ln(Population) -3.934* -0.345*
(2.242) (0.206)
ln(Population)2 0.212** 0.019**
(0.099) (0.009)
ln(Area) 0.468* 0.041*
(0.246) (0.021)
Num. of municipalities 0.324*** 0.028***
(0.082) (0.008)
Coal Field Area Dummy -1.530 -0.076**
(1.361) (0.034)
Remote Islands Dummy 0.212 0.020
(0.416) (0.042)
Depopulated Area Dummy 0.633 0.053
(0.408) (0.032)
Prefecture Instruction Pattern Dummy -0.096 -0.008
(0.371) (0.031)
Prefectural Governor from Bureaucrat Dummy -0.112 -0.010
(0.332) (0.028)
Constant 11.255
(12.605)
Observations 549 549
Log likelihood -172.569
Pseudo R2 0.285
Marginal effects after logit 0.097
Variables
(2)
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Fig 3. Marginal effects 
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Fig 3. (Continued.) 
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